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Abstract 
Given the widespread emphasis on the importance of increasing workforce skills in order to enhance productivity 
performance, it is perhaps surprising that the evidence on the contribution of human capital to inter-country d(fferences 
in productivity performance is still mixed Yet this is certainly the case. This paper argues that two main reasons why 
some studies fail to find a strong role for skills in explaining relative productivity performance at national level are 
difficulties in measuring skills adequately and failure to take account of the mechanisms or channels of influence by 
which skills may exert indirect effects on productivity. Examples of such channels of influence include the 
complementarities of skills with other production inputs and the contributions made by skilled workers to knowledge 
generation and exchange and to innovation processes. However. the paper cautions that. in any single country, 
increases in measured skills may indeed have no e.ffect on relative productivity perforrnance unless those skills are well 
matched to employer requirements and are effectively utilised within firms and other organisations. 
Introduction 1 
Policy-makers around the world now frequently 
emphasise the importance of increasing workforce skills 
in order to enhance productivity performance. In this 
context, it is perhaps surprising that so many 
controversies remain in assessing the scale and nature of 
the contribution of human capital to inter-country 
differences in productivity levels and growth rates. Yet 
this is certainly the case. Firstly, some studies of the 
sources of productivity gaps between countries do not 
fmd a strong role for inter-country differences in skills at 
all. Secondly, even taking account of those studies where 
positive effects of skills have been found. there is 
compelling evidence that increasing skills is rarely a 
sufficient means by itself of improving productivity 
performance. What matters is the way in which skilled 
labow· is combined with other production inputs. ln 
addition, due account needs to be taken of a number of 
diverse mechanisms by which skills may contribute 
indirectly to relative productivity. 
rowth accounting-based estimates typically point to a 
limited role for human capital in explaining cross-counn·y 
differences in performance. For example, Jorgenson, Ho 
and Stiroh (2005) find that the measured connibutions of 
labour quality growth to average labour productivity 
growth in the US, UK, Germany and France between 
1980-2001 were considerably smaller than the combined 
contributions of growth in ICT (information and 
communications technology) and non-ICT capital 
deepening on both sides of the Atlantic. Multivariate 
regression analysis is more likely to find a positive and 
significant impact of human capital on relative 
productivity levels, for example, in Mankiw, Romer and 
Weirs ( 1992) well known cross-sectional study of a large 
number of developed and developing countries. However. 
the panel data results reported by Islam (2003) suggest 
that growth in hwnan capital has no significant effects on 
inter-country differences in productivity growth rates. ln 
a substantial survey of research on the impact of 
human capital on macroeconomic performance, Sianesi 
and van Reenen (2003) emphasise the many 
methodological issues that remain unresolved in this field 
such as the measw·ement of skills and appropriate ways 
of modelling the different channels of influence of 
skills on producth·ity performance. 
This paper assesses a nwnber of potential explanations 
for the apparent difficulties in identifying links between 
hwnan capital and productivity performance at country 
level. It is ordered as follows: Section 2 reports on recent 
comparisons of relative productivity levels in the US and 
leading European countries. Subsequent sections then 
consider the effects of skills measurement problems 
(Section 3), complementarities between skilled labour 
and other production inputs (Section 4). the role of 
skilled labour in contributing to productivity 
performance through knowledge transfer and innovation 
(Sections 5 and 6) and mismatches between skills supply 
and demand (Section 7). Section 8 briefly summarises the 
main conclusions. 
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Accounting for cross-country gaps in labour 
productivity 
Conventional estimates of average labour productivity 
(ALP) levels show the US ahead of large European 
countries on output per worker but behind some or 
all of these European countries on output per worker-
hour (Table 1, Columns 1-6). The difference between the 
two measures reflects longer average annual hours worked 
per employee in the US compared to four of the five 
Ew·opean countries (Table I, Note b). As shown in Table 
I , this broad assessment is supported by three different 
sets of ALP estimates, all of which are sensitive to 
methodological choices made in estimation procedures and 
also in the compilation of the multi-country datasets on 
which they are based. 
In recent years some researchers have developed 
altemative estimates of so-called ·structural' hourly 
productivity levels which take account of economen·ic 
evidence that ALP levels are negatively related to hours 
worked per employee and to employment rates (Belorgey, 
Lecat and Maury, 2006). While the hours effect is 
generally attributed to the effects of ' fatigue' (due to 
shorter holidays as well as longer daily working hours), 
the employment rate effect arises from the exclusion 
of less productive workers (e.g., younger or older 
workers) from employment in countries like France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain which have much lower 
employment rates than the US (Table 1, Note a). 
When adjustments are made for the effects of diminishing 
returns to hours worked and employment rates, the 
resulting estimates of 'structural' ALP levels show the 
US ahead of all fi ve European countries under 
consideration on the hourly productivity measure (Table 
l , Columns 7-9) as well as on the ALP per worker 
measW"e (Bow-les and Cette, 2005). It is therefore of 
considerable interest to evaluate the role of ski lls in 
contributing to continuing US productivity leadership 
over leading Western European economies. 
Table 1: Relative labour productivity levels in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK and US, 2002 (Index numbers: 
US;::tOO) 
Average la bour productivity Average labour productivity 'Structural" hourly 
per worker , 2002 per hour, 2002 productivity, 2002 (b) 
Data source OECD GGDC Euro- OECD GGDC Euro- OECD GGDC Euro-
(a) stat stat stat 
France 95 85 90 113 107 107 98 92 92 
Germany 79 81 74 93 105 92 81 92 80 
Italy 88 85 83 94 99 92 81 85 79 
Spain 79 71 74 74 747 74 68 68 68 
UK 78 75 79 79 86 84 77 84 82 
us 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Bourles and C ette (2005 ). 
Notes: (a) For details of the three sets of estimates based on O I·.CD. GGDC (Groningen Growth and Development Centre) and Eurostat data sets, see 
Bourlcs and Cette, 2005. 1 able I. (b) Sec text for di~cussion of the adjustments for hours worked per employee ond employment rates 
underlying these estimate!>. htimatcd average annual hour~ '-"Orkcd per employee in 2002 were: France 1437, Germany 1443. 1taly 1599, Spain 
1813. UK 1692 and US 1800. [ mploymcnt rates a~ a percent ofthe 15-64 year old population in 2002 were: France 62%, Germany 65%, Italy 56%, 
~pain 60°o. L:K 73°o and L'~ 72°o. 
In order to assess the contribution of di fferent production 
inputs such as physical capital and human capital to 
relative labour productivity performance at sector and/or 
national level, a common struting point is the productivity 
levels equivalent of growth accounting. This method was 
fi rst rigorously set out in Solow ( 1957) and has been 
widely used in productivity studies ever since. in 
particular by Jorgenson and his collaborators (see, for 
example. Jorgenson, et al, 2005). The theoretical 
underpinning for this approach is the neoclassical 
growth model. with underlying assumptions that all 
markets ru·e competiti ve and that all factors in the 
production process are paid their marginal products, the 
sum of which exhausts all retwns fi:om pursuing those 
act ivities. In addition the use of value added to measure 
output involves the assumption that material input is 
separable from other inputs in the production function. 
Under these assumptions, in a growth accounting model 
with two factors (capital and labour), it is possible to 
decompose cross-country differences in relative ALP 
levels into three components: 
1. The proportion explained by differences in 
relative physical capital-intensity 
2. The proportion explained by differences in 
relative labour quality (skills) 
3. A residual MFP (multi-factor productivity) 
component which captures, among other 
th ings, cross-country differences in the 
efficiency with which existing production inputs 
are utilised. 
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This methodology has been recently applied to a series of 
bilateral productivity comparisons between the UK and 
the US, France and Germany (Mason, O'Leary, 
O'Mahony and Robinson, 2008). This study finds that 
physical capital stocks per how· worked accounted for the 
largest shares of the UK-US, UK-France and UK-German 
gaps in ALP in market sectors. Residual MFP accounts 
for a large proportion of the productivity gap between the 
UK and the US while it has a smaller impact on the UK-
France comparison and a negative role in explaining 
the productivity gap between the UK and Germany.2 By 
contrast, inter-country differences in measured skills 
accounted for relatively small proportions of the ALP 
gaps in all three bilateral comparisons (Table 2). 
Table 2: Decomposition of relative labour productivity 
levels in total market sectors (a), UK, US, France and 
Germany, 2002 
u.s. France Germany 
Relative ALP levels (value 133 123 110 
added per hour worked) 
- Index numbers: UK=lOO 
Estimated contributions to 
ALP gaps(% points): 
Physical capital 15 14 ')'") 
--
Workforce skills 2 2 2 
MFP 17 7 -15 
Source: Mason. O'Leary, O' Mahony and Robinson (2008) 
Notes: (a): ' Total market sectors' is here defined to exclude public 
administration, education and health and also real estate and residential 
buildings (NACE 70 in the European industrial classification) since, for 
national accounting purposes, this category includes the imputed rent of 
owner-occupied housing. 
Skills measurement issues 
As an intangible asset, human capital is notoriously 
difficult to measw-e. Typically, use is made of proxy 
measures of skill such as educational level, occupation and 
wages. The most common education-based measures of 
human capital can be divided between education inputs 
(for example, enrolments, years of schooling and 
indicators of education input quality such as class sizes) 
and education outputs (for example, formal qualifications, 
and indicators of education output quality such as test 
scores, literacy standards). 
Discussions in this area are sometimes hampered by the 
use of terms like 'attainments' (an output concept) to 
refer to input measures such as years of completed 
schooling - a measure of attendance rather than 
attainment. Education output measures such as formal 
qualifications have the advantage of captw-ing something 
of what has actually been learned while undergoing 
education, rather than just signifying attendance. 
However, they have the equally clear disadvantage of 
ignoring skills acquired in the workplace without formal 
certification. 
One approach to difficulties in measuring skills across 
countries is to take more care in data series consttuction 
in order to avoid sharp breaks and implausible changes in 
measw-ed skill levels over very short periods of time that 
tend to reflect changes in data collection methods. De la 
Fuente and Domenech (2006) set out to do this by 
collecting information from both national and 
international publications as well as unpublished sources 
in order to obtain well-founded country-specific 
educational profiles for the adult population in 21 OECD 
countries. The information on attainment levels is then 
used to estimate the proportion of the population aged 25 
and over that has started but not necessarily completed 
each of five different levels of education. Their results, 
based on multivariate regression analysis, point to a 
strong and positive impact of years of schooling on 
productivity, with a positive correlation between 
measures of the information content in different datasets 
and the size and significance of coefficients attached to 
the schooling variable. These findings support earlier 
work by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) which identified 
measurement error as a key reason why many earlier 
studies had found that increases in educational attainment 
had little or no impact on growth. 
Another approach to skills measurement problems, as 
in Jorgenson et al (2005) and Mason et al (2008), is to 
make use of education output data (formal qualifications) 
combined with relative earnings data which are intended 
to capture differences in relative productivity between 
different qualification groups. Since individual 
productivity reflects the possession of uncertified skills as 
well as certified educational attainments, this approach 
should in principle help to overcome objections to relying 
on skill measures based solely on formal qualifications. 
Another problem arising in international comparisons of 
qualifications is that there is often no clear equivalence 
between qualification categories such as A levels in the 
UK, the Baccalaw-eate in France and high school 
graduates in the US. Therefore, Mason et al (2008) 
adopt an alternative approach of benchmarking on 
graduate-level qualifications (where comparability 
across countries is at its strongest), and then using 
ratios of mean wages in sub-graduate categories to 
mean graduate wages in each country as indicators of 
labour quality differences between the respective sub-
graduate qualification categories. This avoids having 
to try and classify non-comparable vocational and 
secondary education qualifications from different 
education systems into categories such as ' intermediate ' 
and ' low' qualifications. 
This approach to labour quality measurement represents, 
in principle, a considerable improvement on the use of 
unweighted education input or output data as proxy 
indicators of skills. However, it rests on two key 
underlying assumptions: (1) a broad similarity between 
countries in graduate-level productivity; and (2) that 
mean wage differentials between qualification categories 
reflect differences in the average productivity levels of 
persons classified to each qualification category. With 
regard to assumption ( 1 ), it can be argued that graduates 
are notably more mobile across national borders than 
those in other qualification groups and there is 
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widespread acceptance by employers in the US and 
Western Europe of graduate-level qualifications from 
foreign countries. However, with regard to Assumption 
(2), employee wages may of course deviate from their 
marginal products due to imperfect labour market 
conditions and the operations of country-specific labour 
market institutions such as collective bargaining 
procedures and minimum wage legislation. 
In spite of this sh011coming, wage-based measw-es of 
relative labour quality using graduate-level mean wages 
as a benchmark go some way towards capturing 
variations in relative marginal products across different 
sub-graduate qualification categories in each country. 
However, as shown in Section 2, when this improved 
labom quality measure is used for growth accounting 
purposes by Mason et al (2008), it still does not make a 
large contribution to explaining inter-country ALP gaps. 
The main reason for this seems to be that, in the growth 
accounting framework, the respective connibutions of 
each production input are evaluated separately without 
regard to potential complementarities between physical 
and human capital (for example. the ways in which 
skilled labour is a prerequisite for the selection, 
installation, operation and improvement of physical 
capital equipment). Multivariate techniques do provide 
scope for taking account of these complementarities. 
However. it is clear that more understanding is needed 
of the mechanisms by which skills might be 
expected to contribute indirectly to relative 
productivity perf01mance. We now go on to consider 
some potential channels of influence of skills under two 
main headings: capital-ski 11 complementarities and 
knowledge n·ansfer and innovation. 
Capital-skill complementarities and skill-
biased technical change 
Following Griliches ( 1969). much attention has been paid 
to the hypothesis of ·capital- skill complementarity' 
(CSC) under which physical capital and skilled 
labom are predicted to be more complementary to each 
other as production inputs than are physical capital and 
unskilled labow·. As a proposition CSC is related to but 
separate from the notion of skill-biased technical change 
(SBTC). ie. the argument that skilled labour is more 
complementary to the introduction and/or effective 
utilization of new technologies than is unskilled labour. 
Both the CSC and SBTC literatures are dominated by 
the experience of recent decades and thus benefit from 
some historical perspecth·e. For example. Goldin and 
Katz ( 1998) report evidence that both CSC and SBTC 
were at work in US manufactw-ing between 1909 and 
1940 as producers moved to continuous-process and 
batch methods of production and made greater use of 
electricity. Caselli ( 1999) points out that while some 
technological revolutions such as electrification and 
InfOimation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
have been skill-biased in natw-e, others such as the 
development of assembly-line technology were more 
complementary to unskilled labour. Indeed, technologies 
of a ' de-skilling' kind tend to be introduced more quickly 
than do skill- biased technologies precisely because in 
the latter case the new required skills are likely to be 
costly and time-consuming to develop. 
Recent estimates of ALP growth rates across countries 
show that, after a long period of relatively slow 
productivity growth, the US has benefited 
considerably from accumulated investments in ICTs. 
Between 1995-2004 the US recorded average annual 
growth of 3.1% in total market sectors, compared to 2. 7% 
in the UK, 2.0% in France and 1.6% in Germany 
(Mason et al, 2008). On the basis of industry-level 
analyses, Jorgenson et al (2006) suggest that the 
relatively fast growth in US ALP during this period 
took the form of two different ' productivity surges'. 
The first surge between 1995-2000 was driven primarily 
by ICT capital-deepening and TFP growth in ICT-
producing industries whereas the second surge between 
2000-04 was more attributable to Non-ICT capital-
deepening and TFP growth in ICT -using industries. By 
contrast, the UK, France and Germany have tended to lag 
behind the US in terms of productive applications ofiCTs 
outside ICT-producing industries as well as in ALP 
growth (O'Mahony and van Ark, 2003). 
To what extent can these inter-country contrasts in 
ICT utilization, with their implications for relative 
productivity, be linked to different endowments of skills 
which might be complementary to ICTs? Table 3 shows 
the main differences in qualification levels and the 
composition of formal qualifications between the four 
countries. Throughout the 1995-2004 period the US 
was well ahead of the three European countries in 
tetms of the university graduate share of employment, 
reflecting the established US system of mass higher 
education which built up over several preceding decades. 
The UK increased its graduate share of employment over 
this period (a process which began in the late 1980s) but 
is still well behind the US in tenns of graduate- intensity 
of employment. Both France and Germany also have 
relatively small proportions of graduates by US standards 
but, in the German case, this is offset to some extent by a 
very large share of workers with intermediate-level (craft 
and technician) qualifications. 
A long-running literature has highlighted the role of 
highly-educated or skilled workers in facilitating early 
adoption of new technologies in general (Nelson and 
Phelps, 1966; Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987). More 
recent studies have focused on the role of skills in 
facilitating the effective utilisation of ICTs (for 
example, Brynjolfsson. Hitt and Yang, 2002) and the 
complementarity over several decades between ICTs and 
educated labour required to perform non-routine tasks 
(Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003). However, Chun 
(2003) suggests that while ICT adoption is positively 
related to highly skilled workers, as the new technology 
becomes fully implemented, fl11Tls may be able to replace 
highly skilled workers with lower-paid less-skilled 
workers. According to this view, therefore, ICT -related 
demand for high-level skills may be a temporary 
phenomenon. This perspective fmds support in Ruiz-
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Arranz (2004) who suggests that, as ICT equipment more accessible to lower-skilled workers. 
becomes more user-friendly over time, so it becomes 
Table 3: Employment shares by qualification group, aggregate market sectors, 1995-2004 
1995 2000 2004 
us 
Higher degrees 5 5 6 
Bachelor degrees 15 16 17 
Associate degrees 7 7 8 
Some college but no degree 22 21 21 
High school 35 34 33 
Did not complete high school 16 16 15 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
UK 
Higher degrees 2 3 3 
Bachelor (First) degrees 10 12 13 
National Vocational Qualification Level 3-4 (Craft 36 37 37 
and technician level) 
National Vocational Qualification Level 1-2 35 35 35 
No qualifications 18 13 12 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
FRANCE 
Higher degrees (Bac+5) 3 3 4 
Bachelor degrees (Bac+ 3-4) 9 11 1 1 
Bac+2 (Technician level) 13 14 14 
Baccalaureate 12 14 16 
CAP,BEP 29 29 27 
Low or no qualifications 34 28 27 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
GERMANY 
Higher degrees (Hochschulen) 5 5 7 
Bachelor degree (Fachhochschulen) 4 5 5 
Craft-skilled, Meister, Techniker 69 65 64 
Low or un-skilled 22 25 24 
TOTAL lOO 100 100 
Sources: Mason et al (2008) derived from UK Labour Force Survey. US Current Population Survey, French Enquete-Emploi and the German 
Mikrozensus. 
In order to assess the extent and nature of capital-skill 
complementarity across countries, Mason, O 'Leary and 
Vecchi (2007) estimate wage share equations for different 
qualification groups with capital-output ratios included as 
independent variables, making use of a four-country 
dataset covering 26 manufacturing and service sectors 
over the period 1979-2000. Over this whole period they 
find that, in the UK and France, ICT investments were 
strongly complementary with the wage shares of well-
qualified workers while tending to substitute for low-
qualified workers. By contrast, in Gennany there is no 
evidence at all of complementarity between ICT capital 
and the wage shares of skilled workers. Further research 
is needed to understand this finding for Gennany but it 
may reflect the relatively large supply of craft-skilled 
workers relative to demand which existed prior to the 
diffusion of ICTs. 
For the US Mason et al (2007) fmd a similar degree of 
ICT substitution for unskilled workers as in the UK 
and France but ICTs appear to be more 
complementary to intermediate groups in the US (for 
example, Associate degree holders and those who 
attended college without gaining formal qualifications) 
than to University graduates. Drawing on the same 
dataset, O 'Mahony et al (2008) show that ICT -related 
demand for University graduates in the US was 
relatively strong in the first half of the 1979-2000 
period but did decline relative to demand for 
workers with intennediate qualifications during the 
1990s. 
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Taken together these findings suggest that the US 
productivity resW"gence in the late 1990s may have partly 
reflected. firstly. its early adoption of ICTs facilitated by 
the ready availability of college-educated workers and, 
secondly, its head start in effective utilisation of ICTs 
resulting from this early adoption. As the process of 
improvements in utilisation has unfolded over time, the 
ICT capital -skill complementarity at work appears to 
have shifted towards workers with college education 
below foW"-year Bachelor degree level. 
These different scenarios in each country illustrate the 
extent to which skill effects on relative productivity may 
change over time while also reflecting different national 
education and training institutions. The long 
timescales required for some skill differences to 
affect performance also emerge from consideration of 
skill effects on innovation to which we now turn. 
Skills, knowledge spillovers and innovation 
Skill-related externalities may occm if private sector 
decisions to invest in skills development yield benefits to 
individuals or employers other than those who have made 
the decisions to invest in skills formation. For example. 
the presence of skilled workers in workplaces may help to 
raise the productivity of unskilled eo-workers. At the 
same time high-level skills may be a strategic 
complement to R&D. with externalities arising from 
combined inYestments in skills by workers and in R&D 
by employers. 
Research on innovation has identified a nwnber of 
different mechanisms by which skills- related 
externalities. or spillover effects. can affect perf01mance. 
Examples include the transfer of knowledge between 
fitms. sectors and countries through collaboration on 
R&D and technical problem-solving among skilled 
workers invoh·ed in supply-chains (Lund,all, 1992) and 
the mobility of highly-qualified engineers and scientists 
between fitms (Mason, Beln·amo and Paul, 2004). 
F wthetmore. in order for firms in each country to identify 
and make effective use of knowledge. ideas and 
technologies that become a' ai !able through spillovers, 
what is required is 'absorptive capacity' which may be 
developed through organisations' ovm investments in 
R&D (Cohen and LeYinthal. 1989) and more generally 
through the development or acquisition of high levels of 
workforce skills. 
Thus. for example. Benhabib and Spiegel ( 1994) find that 
hwnan capital stocks are positively associated with 
indh idual countries' ability to narrow the gap between 
themselves and the world-leading nation in terms of 
productivity. Eaten and Kortum ( 1996) find that inward 
technology diffusion increases with a country's hwnan 
capital. Xu (2000) provides e\'idence suggesting that the 
reason why relatively rich countries benefit more than 
poorer counn·ies from hosting US multinational 
subsidiaries may be due to higher threshold levels of 
hwnan capital in rich host countries. 
The absorptive capacity literatw·e initiated by Cohen and 
Levinthal ( 1989) puts particular emphasis on ·the two 
faces of R&D', that is, the role of R&D in both 
generating innovations and in enabling the assimilation of 
innovations generated elsewhere. In a recent cross-
country analysis at sector level between 197 4-1990, 
Griffith et al (2004) explore the impact of absorptive 
capacity on MFP growth, expressed as a function of: (i) 
R&D intensity (ii) an 'MFP gap' measure defined in 
terms of the gap in MFP levels between each country 
and the leader country, assumed to capture the scope 
for technology transfer (iii) human capital defmed in 
terms of the percentage of the population that has 
participated in higher education, and (iv) the interactions 
between the MFP gap measure and, respectively, R&D 
intensity and hwnan capital. The results show that MFP 
growth is positively related to the size of the MFP gap, 
consistent with the convergence literature. More 
importantly, the coefficient on the MFP gap I R&D 
intensity interaction term is positive, thus providing 
support for a key hypothesis relating to absorptive 
capacity, namely. that the further a country is behind the 
MFP leader in a particular industry. the greater is the 
contribution that R&D makes to improving MFP growth 
performance. The coefficients on the hwnan capital and 
R&D intensity I human capital interaction terms are also 
positive and significant although not so high in absolute 
terms as those attached to absorptive capacity. Griffith et 
al conclude therefore that both R&D and workforce skills 
help to stimulate productivity growth via their effects on 
innovation and absorptive capacity. 
Do skill needs vary with distance from the 
technological frontier? 
In recent years Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir 
(2006) have built on the work of Nelson and Phelps 
( 1966) and endogenous growth theorists such as Romer 
( 1990) and Aghion and Howitt ( 1992) to develop a model 
in which hwnan capital contributes to multi-factor 
productivity (MFP) growth in different ways depending 
on how close countries are to the technological frontier. 
Their starting intuition is that countries close to the 
frontier are likely to rely more on innovation than 
imitation whereas the reverse is more likely for countries 
which are relatively distant from the frontier. Drawing 
on a 19-counn·y dataset for the 1960-2000 period, they 
find that MFP growth rates are negatively related (as 
expected) to each country's closeness to the technology 
frontier but are positively related to both the proportion 
of high-skilled (ie, tertiary-educated) labow· and to a 
variable interacting proximity to the technology frontier 
with the proportion of high- ski lled labom. They interpret 
this as evidence that high-skilled labour contributes more 
to MFP growth, the closer each country is to the 
technology frontier. 
These findings have been challenged by Inklaar, Timmer 
and van Ark (2007) who note that Yandenbussche et 
al's estimates of residual MFP growth make no 
allowance for inter-country differences in hours worked 
per employee or in laboW" quality (educational 
attainment). Using an 11-country dataset for 9 service 
industries. Inklaar et al replicate Vandenbussche et al's 
approach using a more sophisticated MFP measure 
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(whlch takes full account of indicators of labour input 
quantity and quality) and find that the human capital 
variable and the interaction tenn between proximity to 
the technological frontier and the proportion of high-
skilled labour are both no longer statistical ly significant. 
This applies whether analysing a country-level dataset or 
a cross-country set of market service sectors. Hence 
Inklaar et al's results provide no evidence of externalities 
from employing high-skilled workers. 
Subsequently, Mason, O'Leary and Vecchi (2008) have 
drawn on a five-country sector- level dataset for 1979-
2000 to regress the rate of growth of MFP on the 
technology gap at time t-1, the number of highly skilled 
workers as a proportion of total workers at time t- 1 
(highski/1) and the interaction between the latter two 
terms. The distance of each country/sector from the 
technological frontier is defmed as the gap between each 
country/sector MFP level and the MFP level of the 
frontier counny/sector.3 All estimations are canied out 
using two stage least squares estimators, taking lagged 
values of the dependent variables as instruments. 
As expected, the coefficients on the technology gap 
measure are positive and significant in all equations, 
providing further support for the idea that productivity 
laggards have greater scope for catching up with 
productivity leaders through successful absorption of 
knowledge and technologies generated elsewhere (Table 
4). In contrast to Inklaar et al (2006), we find the 
coefficient on high-skilled labour to be positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level, implying the 
presence of some externalities to the use of high-
skilled labour. At the same time however, the coefficient 
on the term interacting the technology gap and skilled 
labour measure is non-significant. Moreover, when the 
interaction tenn is introduced, the human capital 
externality effect disappears. 
Thus no support is found for Yandenbussche et ars 
argument that the contribution of high-skilled labour to 
MFP growth is higher, the closer the country is to the 
technologicalfrontier. One possible reason for this is that. 
as discussed in Section 5. the skills required for 
successful absorption of knowledge and technologies 
generated elsewhere are non-negligible. Thus high-level 
skills may well have a part to play in facilitating others' 
innovations. 
Mismatches between skills supply and 
demand 
In spite of the many positive effects of human capital 
on relative productivity discussed in Sections 4-5, there 
are also many ways that measured skills can increase 
without inducing any positive effects on productivity. For 
example, this can occur if the skills in question do not 
actually match the skill requirements of enterprises or if 
the proxy measures of skills in use such as formal 
qualifications convey an exaggerated impression of the 
quality of ski lls which are actually in use in the 
workplace. 
Table 4: Estimating the impact of highly skilled 
human capital on MFP growth 
(1) (2) (3) 
Technology gap (t-1) 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.052* 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.032) 
Highskill (t-1) 0.327* 0.231 
(0.172) (0.211) 
Interaction of 0.152 
technology gap and (0.1 15) 
highskill 
Observations 1911 1911 1911 
AndersonLR Statistic 4 10.968 400.045 396.101 
Statistic ( x 2 ) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HansenJ Statistic ( x 2 ) 0.316 0.271 0.302 (0.574) (0.603) (0.859) 
Notes: •• •=significant at I%, • •=significant at 5%, •=signi ficant ut 
I 0%. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. corrected for clustering, 
are in brackets. All variables have been instrumented with their own 
value at time t-2 and t-3 . For details of the Anderson LR statistic and the 
Hansen J statistic. see notes to Table I. 
These issues have arisen very strongly in the UK 
following a rapid transition from elite higher education to 
mass higher education between the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s. By the year 2000 graduates represented 15% of 
the total workforce in the UK, up from just under 
I 0% ten years earlier.4 One consequence of this 
development has been increasing rep01ts of 'under-
utilisation' of the skills of some graduates who find 
employment in relatively low-skilled jobs. Another has 
been complaints from some employers that a propmtion 
of newly-produced graduates do not possess the level of 
skills n·aditionally associated with graduates. These 
concerns can be exaggerated and detailed assessments 
of the UK graduate labour market suggest that the 
expansion of graduate output has also had some positive 
effects on skills supply and job performance (Mason, 
2002: Elias and Pw·cell. 2004). However. the point 
remains that increases in the output of certain 
qualifications. showing up as increases in measured skills. 
may or may not conn·ibute positively to productivity 
performance. 
One way to assess this on a cross-counn·y comparative 
basis is to consider evidence on the extent to which 
university graduates, and indeed other ski lied workers as 
well, are in relatively low-paid employment, implying 
that their productivity is relatively low. Here we draw 
on national labom market studies which have adopted a 
standard defmition of 'low pay' , namely, gross hourly 
earnings lower than two thirds of median gross hourly 
earnings in each counny Table 5 shows that in recent 
years only about 4-6% of graduates or those educated to 
tertiary level in the US, UK, France and Gennany are 
low-paid by this definition. However, the proportions in 
low-paid employment are much greater for high school 
graduates in the US ( 18%) and holders of craft-skilled or 
equivalent qualifications in the UK (20%) and Ge1many 
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( 18%). These are non-negligible proportions of formally 
qualified workers in low-paid employment and, asswning 
that relative pay bears some relation to relative 
productivity in each country, the results serve as a 
reminder that efforts to raise skills by increasing the 
output of formally qualified workers may not always 
contribute positively to productivity performance. 
Table 5: Proportion of workforce in low-paid 
employment, US, UK, France and Germany, 
analysed by qualification group (a) 
us (2001) 
Tertiary education (Bachelor 
degrees, Associate degrees, some 
college education without degree) 
UK (2005) 
Uni\crsity graduates 
NVQ Level 3 (A levels. craft-
skilled, or equivalent) 
FRANCE (2002) 
Tertiary education (Bac+2 or 
higher) 
Baccalaureate 
GERMANY (2003) 
Graduates (Hochschule or 
F achhochschule) 
Craft-skilled 
% of work force in low-
paid employment (b) 
6 
5 
20 
4 
12 
4 
18 
Sources: Derived from papers prepared for Russell Sage Foundation 
project on Low-Wage Employment in the United States and Western 
Europe by John SchmitL Geofr Mason, Ken Mayhew and Matthew 
Os borne: Philippc Askenazy. Eve Caroli and Jer6me Gautie; and 
Gerhard Bosch and fhorsten Kalina. 
Notes: 
(a) Refers to all employees (full-time plus part-time) in each country 
except for Gennany where only full- time employees covered by the 
social !.ccurity system are included and France where apprenticel> are 
excluded. 
(b) L ow-paid employment is defined as having grosl> hourly earnings 
lower than two thirds of median gross hnurly earnings in each country. 
Assessment 
It is by no means easy to assess the scale and nature of 
the contribution of hwnan capital to inter-counn·y 
differences in productivity levels and growth rates. 
This suryey of relevant literature and research findings 
suggests that there are many positive effects of hwnan 
capital on relati ve productivity at counu-y level. However, 
these effects only emerge clearly when efforts are 
made to improve the measurement of skills and to 
identify the main channels of influence by which skills 
may affect performance indirectly as well as directly (for 
example, through the complementarities of skills with 
other production inputs and the contributions made by 
ski lied workers to knowledge generation and exchange 
and to innovation processes). At the same time increases 
in measured skills may have no effect on relative 
productivity performance unless those skills are well 
matched to employer requirements and are effectively 
utilised within enterprises. 
Notes 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
This paper draws in part on joint work with Mary 
O'Mahony, Michela Vecchi, Kate Robinson and 
Brigid O 'Leary at the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research. Responsibility for 
errors in the present paper is mine alone. 
The negative MFP contribution in the UK-
German comparison suggests that, while 
Germany benefits relative to the UK from its 
accumulated advantages in capital stocks and (to a 
much lesser extent) skills, the UK gains from more 
efficient use of its capital equipment and skilled 
labour. However, the UK still pays a penalty in 
ALP terms for having accumulated relatively low 
levels of physical capital and skills over time. 
The five countries are UK, US, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands. In total the 
dataset covers 26 sectors in both manufacturing 
and services in each country. 
Estimates derived from UK Labour Force Survey 
as in Table 3. 
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